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A European convergence 




the article revolves around the doctrine of precedent within the so-called 
European legal space, wondering whether and to what extent we can speak 
of a convergence towards a stare decisis model boosted by the harmonizing 
role of the court of Justice of the European Union. the article argues that 
although there are still some differences between civil law and common law 
legal systems they regard more the style of reasoning and the deep unders-
tanding of the relationship between the present decision of a court and past 
judicial decisions than the very existence of the constraints of the latter upon 
the former. the article concludes that a sort of mechanism of stare decisis has 
in fact been created, even though, on the one hand, uncertainty remains as 
to the way in which the binding force of a precedent concretely operates in 
the system, and on the other hand, this mechanism relates exclusively to the 
relationships between past and future decisions of higher courts (horizontal 
effect). this change, far from being a shift towards a truly judge-made law 
system or a consequence of the final abandonment of the dictates of the rule 
of law, enhances legal certainty contributing to the fundamental requirement 
of stability of law as a feature of the ideal of the rule of law.
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diciembre de 2014. Fecha de modificación: 15 de abril de 2015. Fecha de aceptación: 10 
de octubre de 2015. Para citar el artículo: civitarese, s. (2015). A European converge 
towards a stare decisis model? Revista Digital de Derecho Administrativo n.º 14, Universidad Ex-
ternado de colombia, pp. 173-194. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18601/21452946.n14.09 
Stefano Civitarese174
Revista digital de deRecho administRativo, n.º 14, segundo semestRe/2015, pp. 173-194
Keywords: Stare decisis, precedent, European Union law, Administrative 
law, judicial liability.
La convergencia europea hacia un modelo  
de stare decisis
rEsUmEn
El artículo analiza la doctrina del precedente al interior del espacio legal 
europeo, preguntándose si es posible y hasta qué punto es razonable hablar 
de una convergencia hacia un modelo de stare decisis impulsado por el rol de 
armonización que ha desempeñado la corte de Justicia de la Unión Europea. 
se argumenta también que aunque hay aún algunas diferencias entre el common 
law y el civil law, estas se refieren más a la forma de razonar y a la comprensión 
de las relaciones entre la decisión de una corte y sus pasadas decisiones que 
a la existencia misma de limitaciones de la última en relación con la anterior. 
recientes reformas del derecho contencioso administrativo que se refieren a 
la fuerza vinculante de las decisiones de las altas cortes administrativas han 
sido entendidas como un evento de cambio hacia un modelo de precedente, 
punto sobre el cual acá se hacen algunas consideraciones. se concluye que una 
especie de mecanismo de stare decisis ha sido, en efecto, creado; aun así, de un 
lado, permanece cierta incerteza en relación con la forma en la que la fuerza 
vinculante de los precedentes opera de manera concreta en el sistema, y de otro 
lado, este mecanismo se refiere exclusivamente a la relación entre decisiones 
pasadas y futuras de las altas cortes (efecto horizontal). Este cambio, lejos de 
ser un cambio hacia un verdadero sistema de derecho creado por el juez o 
una consecuencia del abandono final de los principios del Estado de derecho, 
refuerza la seguridad jurídica contribuyendo a la exigencia fundamental de 
estabilidad del derecho como una característica del Estado de derecho.
Palabras clave: stare decicis, precedente, derecho europeo, derecho admi-
nistrativo, responsabilidad judicial.
IntrodUctIon
the purpose of this article is to portray some operational ways of the doctrine 
of precedent within the so-called European legal space and to discuss whether 
and to what extent we can speak of a progression towards a stare decisis model.
the first part of this article will examine the European court of Justice 
(ecJ) jurisprudence (section 3), in light of the English common law system 
(section 2) and civil law systems such as France and Germany. From this 
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examination, distinct differences among these legal systems can be exposed. 
these distinctions are marked by a different approach regarding rationale 
and the understanding of the relationship between the current decision of a 
court and previous case law, more than the very existence of constraints of 
the latter upon the former.
Both similarities and differences can be observed in the ambiguous way in 
which the European court of Justice (ecJ) has built its own peculiar doctrine 
of precedent. such a picture of the precedent doctrine and practice aims to 
put in perspective the novelty of a discipline regarding the decisions of the 
council of state, the Italian higher administrative court, which seems to pave 
the way for a mechanism of stare decisis.
sections 4, 5 and 6 of the article are dedicated to analysing and discussing 
the legal discipline whose purpose, according to the drafters of the law, is not 
to introduce any form of binding precedent, because such doctrine would 
challenge the principle of the subjection of judges only to the statutory law.
I conclude by asserting that a sort of mechanism of stare decisis has been for-
med in the decisions of the council of state. Although, uncertainty exists as 
to how the binding force of precedent concretely operates within the system, 
since it is obvious that this mechanism relates exclusively to the relationships 
between past and future decisions of higher courts (horizontal effect).
this change, anyway, far from being a shift towards a truly judge-made 
law system or a consequence of the final neglect of states of the rule of law, 
enhances legal certainty contributing to the fundamental requirement of sta-
bility of law as an idealized vision of the rule of law.
I. thE common lAW doctrInE oF PrEcEdEnt  
And thE UsE oF cAsE lAW In thE cIvIl lAW sYstEms
our starting point must be the common law doctrine of precedent: the basic 
idea is that similar cases should be decided alike. this is first of all an empirical 
truth, for in every jurisdiction a judge tends to decide a case in the same way 
as another judge did in a similar case3.
When such a tendency is not only strong enough, but there is an obliga-
tion to follow a previous decision, in the absence of justification for departing 
from such a decision we can speak of a system which fully adheres to the stare 
decisis rule.
What we should bear in mind is that such a positive obligation means 
that a court must abide by a precedent just because of its status as precedent, 
without reasoning at all about the content and value of the precedent itself.
3 cross & harris (1991, p. 3).
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this is quite different from something like “learning from the past” and 
being persuaded to apply the same reasoning as used in a previous similar case 
by someone else. the values here are stability and predictability not creative 
jurisprudence. such a doctrine, therefore, is fully consistent with the tenets 
of the ideal of the rule of law.
secondly, this concept of likeness or similarity is probably the most ambi-
guous point. It is not referring to an identical case, just a similar one4.
For the sake of clarity, we can say that in a legal system where case law is 
meant to produce a coercive effect, judges are not just obliged to take into 
some consideration a previous decision of another judge on a similar case but 
they have to decide the ensuing case in the same way: the precedent is said 
to be “binding” and not simply persuasive.
With such a strict meaning of precedent a number of technicalities arise, 
(the mechanics of precedent), and the most important are the following: (1) 
the distinction between “ratio decidendi” (holding) and “obiter dictum”; (2) 
the one between vertical and horizontal binding effect; and (3) the concept 
of overruling.
the binding part of a previous decision is limited in scope to the point 
of law (the rule) used to reach a certain outcome5, which in civil law systems 
is analogous to “principles” of law, as we shall see further in our discussion.
vertical effects refer to how the hierarchical organisation of a judiciary 
operates, where a court is bound to apply the rule established by a higher 
court, while horizontal effects refer to the obligation of a court to follow its 
own case law.
Unlike lower courts facing higher court decisions, courts considering their 
own previous decisions have the capacity to overrule them on occasion. such 
a right has been expressly acknowledged in England under the house lord 
Practice statement of 1966 (statement) where the lord chancellor stated that 
precedents are binding on the court however the court has the discretionary 
power to depart from a past decision6.
nonetheless, the house of lords has used this discretionary power on 
very few occasions. the revised Practice direction: direction 3.1.3, under the 
newly established supreme court, reiterates that the statement still applies 
and requires that an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court 
must state clearly if it is to ask “the supreme court to depart from one of its 
own decisions or from one made by the house of lords”.
4 see on this point shauer (2009, pp. 44-54).
5 that is precisely the ratio decidendi, on which see stone (1959, pp. 597-620).
6 It is worth noticing that a common reason for the Justices to decline to depart from a pre-
cedent is that any change is better left to Parliament and this was the majoritarian view 
at least until 1966.
A European convergence towards a stare decisis model? 177
Revista digital de deRecho administRativo, n.º 14, segundo semestRe/2015, pp. 173-194
It is worth stressing that the underlying idea regarding overruling lies in 
the desirability of an open and honest departure from a past decision. In other 
words it is not considered fair to conceal the change of law behind subtle dis-
tinctions regarding the circumstances of the case. therefore, it is still a case 
for certainty, which justifies the doctrine of overruling7.
this picture of a legal system based on precedent highlights the big division 
between legal systems rooted in a case law “method” and systems which reject 
it by only relying on legal sources strictly established outside the judiciary.
It is fair to notice, though, that such features are not at odds with the fact 
that the law (in England too) is also based on laws enacted by legislative bo-
dies which can prevail over case law.
this represents a similarity between the two alleged models, as in actual 
fact the duty of the courts in both of them is often one of statutory interpre-
tation, where reasoning by analogy is one of the primary features.
the French legal system is often cited as a system which lies on the extreme 
side of the spectrum. Article 5 of the Code civile (civil code) forbids judges 
both to set forth general rules when handing down a decision and base a deci-
sion exclusively on a past one8. however, one cannot definitively assert that a 
French judge does not rely on case law. one should consider, for instance, that 
the droit administratif and the Conseil d’Etat historically have relied on case law9.
Perhaps the current trend is that civil law judges do not feel themselves 
bound by a precedent as such, but by the repetition of a certain number of 
precedents that agree on a single point10.
7 the motivation for the 1966 Practice statement, in which their lordships recognized 
their ability to depart from prior decisions, was to free the judges from the awkwardness 
of the practice of distinguishing bad precedents, confining them to their facts,
 
which ran 
the risk of both discrediting the highest court and bringing the law into disrepute. It was, 
therefore, an important addition to the judicial arsenal.
8 Article 5: créé par loi 1803-03-05 promulguée le 15 mars 1803: “Il est défendu aux juges 
de prononcer par voie de disposition générale et réglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont 
soumises”.
9 see Garner (1924, pp. 597-627), where the author significantly observes that a “striking 
difference between the French droit administratif and the administrative law of Anglo-
saxon countries, so far as there is any, is that the former is almost entirely jurisprudential 
(to employ a French term); that is to say, it is case law. It is largely the work of the council 
of state (the supreme administrative court of France), of the tribunal of conflicts (a special 
tribunal for deciding conflicts of competence between the civil and administrative courts) 
and to some extent of the court of cassation (the supreme judicial court of France). In this 
respect it bears a striking resemblance to the common law of England and the United 
states” (p. 598).
10 cross & harris (1991, p. 11). see also deoorter & parisi (2004, p. 667), on the evolu-
tion from a widespread use in early legal systems of a line of consistent past decisions as a 
way of make a sound present decision to the establishment of a doctrine of authoritative 
precedent in English law.
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If one looks at Germany the alleged absence of a precedent-based jurispru-
dence is even less defensible, although German academics are eager to claim 
that court decisions are not formally binding11. there are a number of statu-
tes that somehow confer a direct or indirect binding effect of superior court 
decisions on inferior courts. For example, there are special rights of appeal 
against lower courts that fail to abide by the precedents, established by one 
of the five federal sectorial courts; these five constitute the highest courts. 
other rules regarding, for example, the constitutional court, also deal with 
horizontal influence, seeking to encourage the judges to follow the precedent 
of their own court12.
this latter assertion identifies a difference between the two models; the 
very foundation of the doctrine of precedent in England is based on a rule of 
practice, contrasted by continental Europe in which precedent is often derived 
from a statutory provision13.
taking into account the distinctive characteristics of judiciaries in con-
tinental legal systems (the professional status of judges as civil servants; the 
distinction between district courts with adjudicative powers and a supreme 
court whose remit is limited to assessing the correct application of the law 
by inferior courts, and the absence of dissenting opinions), a plausible way of 
approaching this shifting area of law is to create judicial precedent – or better 
effects of past judgments – a concept that spans a broad area, encompassing 
such things as res judicata, the nomophylactic function and stare decisis.
the distinguishing line between the nomophylactic function – the function 
of assuring conformity with legal rules throughout the legal system – and stare 
decisis is not clear. It is well known that in accordance with the nomophylactic 
function, all apical jurisdictions should ensure a uniform application of law.
For instance, in Italy, the court of cassation is vested with this power 
which has long been characterized as a concept of the so-called concept of 
the “living law”. decision n.º 3 of 1956, was one of the of the first decisions in 
which the Italian constitutional court asserted that a “court, even though it 
must interpret autonomously both the constitutional norm allegedly violated 
and the statutory norm which infringes the former, cannot ignore a constant 
judicial interpretation which bestows upon the legislative provision its own 
actual value in legal life”.
living law, according to the constitutional court, is derived from well-
established case law, even though it is not totally univocal. Whenever there 
11 historically, decisions of the Imperial chamber court founded in 1495 – the first appeals 
court to have jurisdiction over all decisions of lower courts in German territories – were 
considered as containing principles in a quasi-statute manner and had to be followed as 
binding precedents. see lundmark (2012, p. 344).
12 lundmark (2012, p. 357).
13 see infra section 4 about the Italian case.
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is a certain amount of decisions about the meaning of a statutory disposition, 
made primarily by the court of cassation, sitting as United chambers, the 
rule so determined is the one to be submitted to the constitutional court, 
even though prima facie it looks different from the literal meaning. thus, in such 
cases, although courts are not under a formal obligation to follow the court 
of cassation case law, to diverge from the “living law”, a court must resort to 
serious and adequate arguments to depart from such precedent.
recently, and set forth in section 4, such a judge-made rule has been partly 
“incorporated” into legislation, stating the inadmissibility of an appeal based on 
reasons which conflict with a principle established by the court of cassation.
tension between precedent in the strictest sense and case law as well can 
create complexities. A thorough consideration of case law by judges, seeking 
out the essence of strands of judicial decisions, could be in conflict with the 
most recent decision counting as a precedent. so this might be a way of de-
parting from a binding precedent.
From this discussion, we can conclude that the distinction between common 
law and civil law regarding precedent does not function as a dichotomy, exis-
ting as substantial overlapping practices, where as there are still technicalities 
which make the common law tradition distinct in its own right. leaving aside 
such technicalities, what seems to be at the heart of the English approach to 
precedent lies mainly in a certain style of reasoning, developed and refined 
through the practice of a fact-driven analysis in order to identify the rationale 
of a decision and exercising the art of distinguishing from prior case law. this 
observation is further supported by the fact that the single opinion handed 
down by a judge, often conflict with each other, which is absent in the civil 
law tradition.
II. thE EcJ doctrInE oF PrEcEdEnt
the observations drawn in the previous section help us to assess the ecJ posi-
tions, whose original model is derived from the civil law tradition.
the ecJ was founded primarily on the French Conseil d’Etat and for this reason 
precedent initially did not play a major role in its case law14. the influence of 
the French legal tradition can be seen especially in the style of its judgment 
and its way of reasoning, which tend to be formal15. collective judgment and 
concise reasoning are not fecund grounds for a doctrine of precedent16.
14 tridimas (2012, pp. 308-309).
15 see mcauliffe (2013, pp. 483-493), on the influence that the same use of the French as 
the language of the deliberations of the ecJ exerts on the development of a de facto use of 
precedent.
16 tridimas (2012). It has also been pointed out that the power to depart from its previous 
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however, once the court developed quite a significant amount of case law 
it started the practice of extensively citing its own cases in order to justify 
successive judgments.17 however, this does not suffice to affirm that the ecJ 
has in fact embraced a true doctrine of precedent. now the court has become 
progressively concerned with the consistency of new cases with the principles 
and directives established in its previous landmark cases.
the acquis communautaire has been identified as a major influence in the ecJ’s 
new attitude towards its earlier judgments. this precedent value establishes 
a kind of vertical relationship between the ecJ and the judiciary of each and 
every member state, resulting from the eu law order as a function of national 
courts as decentralised organs of the Union18. hence, such a precedent value 
attaches more to the vertical side than to the actual meaning of stare decisis, 
which lies in the horizontal dimension of the doctrine of precedent.
the importance of landmark cases such as Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. enel 
in the development of the eu order has played a key role in this area as well19. 
the judgments handed down by the court set forth principles of direct effect 
and primacy of eu law, triggering a process of constitutionalisation of the 
treaties. one of the consequences of this process was breaking up the mono-
poly of the states to grant individual rights, which have remained undisputed.
thus, it was necessary to preserve and reinforce the legacy of Van Gend en 
Loos and Costa to guarantee eu rights, which favoured an increasing reliance 
on precedent. It has been noted that the ecJ “worked assiduously to develop 
what is now a robust and taken-for-granted set of practices associated with 
precedent”20.
setting aside the inquiry as to whether such practices embody an actual 
common law doctrine of precedent or an informal precedent value21, it is wi-
dely acknowledged that, due to the mechanism provided for by Article 267 
tfeu22, the weight of the ecJ decisions towards members states is not limited 
to the traditional declarative (nomophylactic) function of a national higher 
court in a system of civil law.
decisions was a necessary device of a court whose decisions could only be changed by 
amending the treaties: arnull (1993, pp. 247, 248). 
17 stone sweet & mccowan (2003, pp. 109-115), who refer to data from the years 1961-
1998 in which they record a cite of 2,057 different cases out of a total of 2,674 rulings. 
18 tridimas (2012, p. 309).
19 case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ecr 1; case 6/64 
costa v enel [1964] ecr 585.
20 stone sweet (2004, pp. 97-98).
21 or of a precedent of interpretation rather than of solution (tridimas, 2012).
22 As as been noted the development of ‘precedent’ is inextricably linked to the procedure 
of preliminary ruling under tfeu Art. 267 tfeu (mcAuliffe, 2013, p. 484).
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It is especially the obligation of national laws, derived from the treaties, 
to provide effective remedies for the protection of eu rights, which creates 
the obligation for national courts to treat the ecJ rulings as binding decisions. 
the logical premise of this state of affairs is that it is the interpretation pro-
vided by the ecJ – which enjoys an exclusive jurisdiction over this – and not 
the law as it theoretically originates from the written sources of eu law, which 
determines a precise obligation to abide by such an interpretation.
the ecJ doctrine of acte clair and acte éclairé establishes that courts of last 
resort are exempted from submitting a question for a preliminary ruling un-
der article 267.3 tfeu, if either the meaning of any eu legal dispositions is 
clear beyond any doubt23 or the point of interpretation in issue is materially 
identical to a matter already decided. the acte éclairé doctrine creates a sort 
of normative effect, well beyond the proceeding which has caused the ecJ 
interpretation to be made24, for absent this exemption courts of last resort 
are under an obligation to resort to the ecJ should they conclude that the 
interpretation already provided by the court itself does not suit the case at 
hand25. Practically speaking, this means that not following the principle of 
law previously established by the ecJ is not an option.
Instrumental to this doctrine is a line of ecJ cases through which the court 
has imposed liabilities on a member state for the breach of eu obligations, 
when a court of last resort failed to comply with the duty to bring before the 
court a matter concerning the interpretation of the treaties26.
When examining the horizontal effects, the ecJ approach to stare decisis is 
more relaxed. the ecJ regularly refers to its ‘settled’ case law, but it does not 
treat its past rulings as formally binding27.
the court employs the technique of distinguishing cases, whereby it can 
adjust its rationale without completely disregarding a previous decision28. 
however, when the ecJ either follows one of its previous rulings or makes a 
23 the question is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt both to the 
courts of the other member states and to the court of Justice (283/81 cilfit v. ministry 
of health [1982] ecr 3415, para. 16). 
24 despite the fact that Article 228 tfeu reads that the decisions of the ecJ are binding only 
on those to whom they are addressed.
25 Joined cases 28-30/62 Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belasting-administratie [1963] ecr 31, para. 13; 
cilfit, supra n. 17 para. 14.
26 see below section 6 for references to case law.
27 tridimas (2012, pp. 313-314).
28 A good example is the position of the ecJ about legal certainty and res judicata as prin-
ciples of eu law despite although it disregards them on occasions. this has been done 
without overruling past decisions but making particular legal and factual circumstances 
count as exceptions to the rule (case c-119/05, Lucchini v Ministero dell’industria del commercio 
e dell’artigianato [2007] I-495; case c-2/08, Olimpiclub vs. Amministrazione dell’economia e delle 
finanze [2009] ecr I-7501; case c-224/01 Koebler v. Austria [2003] ecr I-10239).
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distinction, rarely does the court discuss or provide an analysis or rationale, 
which is distinct from the tradition of English courts.
In conclusion, there are three main factors concerning the ecJ approach 
to precedent to be considered: the court normally glosses over the problem 
of treating past decisions as binding; the sources to interpret (the treaties) 
are highly general, indeterminate and often obscure; and the court enjoys a 
self-conferred capacity to develop unwritten principles. such factors allow 
the ecJ to operate in two apparently opposite directions.
the court is able to determine the outcome of certain cases by ignoring 
previous case law, while the vagueness of principles and doctrines enunciated 
by the court make it a rarity that an actual change of the ruling is necessary29. 
As previously noted, almost invariably the ecJ is then able to “encompass 
subsequent cases within the concept of a prior case. this lends a certain arti-
ficiality to the recitation of previous case law; it is the broad concepts, not so 
much particular prior cases, that can and do determine the outcome”30. We can 
conclusively observe that the ecJ has indeed developed an original doctrine 
of precedent, especially driven by its position at the highest position of such 
a peculiar order as the eu. therefore it comes as no surprise that we cannot 
define with certainty whether the eu law embraces a clear doctrine of binding 
precedent. After all, as has been pointed out, the eu brings together many 
different legal orders from civil and common law traditions31.
due to the coercive and quasi-normative effects that ecJ rulings have on 
the “hierarchy” of the integrated eu-member states judiciary, the court itself 
tends to resemble something in between a constitutional court of a civil law 
state and the English supreme court. It departs from a pure English model, 
though, as to the uncertain status of the horizontal dimension of precedent 
(stare decisis in its strictest sense).
the catalytic interaction between the ecJ and national courts of member 
states tends to favour a trend towards a more general reliance on coercive 
effects of past decisions that extend beyond an individual case. this is the 
case for the Italian legal system, where recent statutory amendments seem to 
introduce a kind of formal mechanism of stare decisis, albeit limited in scope as 
we shall see in the following section.
29 there would be cases, albeit few, of express overruling, which anyway show that the ecJ 
gives respect to its precedents. see tridimas, supra n 11, 316, who mentions haG i and 
ii (case c-10/89 cnl-sucal v haG Gf (haG ii) [1990] ecr i-3711. (61) case 192/73 van 
zuylen v haG (haG i) [1974] ecr 731) as the first cases of express overruling.
30 conway (2012, p. 245). the author maintains that “the broad concepts or principles of 
effectiveness and loyalty to the community allowed the court a choice as to whether to 
encompass liability for judicial error in the emergent doctrine of state liability, and it was 
several years before it did so in Kobler”.
31 komarek (2008-09, p. 399).
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III. thE cAsE For vErtIcAl And horIZontAl BIndInG 
EFFEct oF PrEcEdEnt In ItAlIAn AdmInIstrAtIvE lAW
my analysis is confined to the administrative jurisdiction, although many of 
the issues addressed below could have an effect on the judiciary as a whole.
Article 99 of the code of Administrative court Procedure (cacp) of 2010, 
reads as follows:
1. the chamber to which a proceeding is assigned, if it maintains that the point 
of law submitted to its evaluation either has brought about or might bring about 
jurisprudential conflict, can, with a motivated order, either on a request of the 
parties or on its own motion, submit the decision of the recourse to the Plenary 
session. the latter, if so deemed to be opportune, can send back the proceedings 
to the chamber.
2. Ahead of the decision, the President of the council of state, on a request of 
the parties or on its own motion, can defer any recourse to the Plenary session 
either to resolve general questions of particular importance or to settle jurispru-
dential conflict.
3. the chamber to which a proceeding is assigned, which does not agree on a 
principle of law enunciated by the Plenary session, shall submit to the Plenary 
session itself, with a motivated order, the decision about the recourse.
4. the Plenary session shall decide the whole proceeding, unless it only wants 
to pronounce on a principle of law sending back the remaining matter to the 
remitting chamber.
5. If the Plenary session evaluates that the question is of remarkable importan-
ce, it can anyway declare the principle of law to the interest of the legal system 
even though it either declares the recourse non receivable, inadmissible or non 
prosecutable or it states that the proceeding is extinct. In such cases the decision 
of the Plenary session does not affect the challenged administrative decision32.
Article 374.3 of the Italian civil Procedural code (cpc) provides a similar rule 
in article 99.3 regarding the relationship between the United chambers and 
each chamber of the court of cassation.
Article 360-bis of the civil court Procedural code provides a legal provi-
sion (absent in the administrative court procedural code) in which an appeal 
to the court of cassation “shall be inadmissible: when the impugned decision 
has settled the questions of law in a manner which abides by the court case 
law and the motives for pleading the annulment do not offer elements either 
32 translated into English by the author.
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to confirm or deny such case law”33, which is the inverse of the rule adopted 
in Germany and referred to above.
the court of cassation interprets this provision in light of the principle of 
effective judicial guarantee in which an appropriate balance between the right 
of the parties to resort to the court of cassation for a violation of the law and 
the actual possibility for the court itself to achieve its function must be esta-
blished. this must be accomplished by conferring the interpretative directives 
of the court not only a persuasive effect but also a certain degree of stability.
I agree with recent publications that have argued on this point, and have 
stated that such a mechanism implies a kind of binding force of precedent 
not too different from the English legal system in regard to vertical effects.34 
however, such a rule on vertical effects of the higher court rulings has not 
been written into legislation with regard to the decisions of the council of 
state vis-à-vis administrative courts of first instance.35
the legal provision referred to above – namely paragraph 3 – establishes 
a type of horizontal effect on particular judgments.
there the case of one of the four jurisdictional chambers of the council 
of state dealing with the application of a “principle of law” previously set by 
the highest body within the council of state – the Plenary session (csps) is 
displayed. the clause is worded in a negative fashion, demanding the chamber 
(not in agreement with such a principle), to yield to the decision of the csps. 
however, there is a positive command in which the chamber is expected to 
abide by the principles of law established by the csps.
It seems that the focus of this legal provision is on the “principle of law” 
and can be interpreted with what is known in the doctrine of precedent as 
ratio decidendi – the process of creating a principle in which such reasoning can 
be applied in future cases on the condition that they present some common 
features.
the provision in discussion embodies such a principle and is one that the 
csps has enunciated. the logical inquiry is whether this implies that such 
principles have to be clearly and expressly defined in a previous decision, or 
there is a duty on each chamber to actively identify them in the csps case law, 
or even make reasonable deductions from previous decisions.
33 translated into English by the author.
34 speziale (2011, p. 1009). 
35 the broadest scope for a binding precedent is made by the law with regard to the procee-
dings before the Italian court of Auditors. the mechanism is the same as the one provided 
for by article 99 cpac, but the obligation to bring the question about the principle of law 
before the “united chambers” is extended to the court of first instance (article 42 Act of 
Parliament n.º 69 of 2009).
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the use of such a verb as “enunciate”36 suggests that the first alternative is 
preferred and it seeks to provide a mechanism for enhancing legal certainty, 
which shall be discussed in my conclusion. It is worth noting the opinion 
that the Plenary session should adopt a clearer and more controlled way of 
reasoning so as to make people (and fellow judges) aware of any relevant ratio 
decidendi and avoiding as much as possible obiter dicta.37
It is worth noting that for some time now the csps has progressed by 
implementing a new rule that was introduced as a practice of listing at the 
conclusion of decisions the “principles of laws” enacted (so called “maxims”), 
thus providing substance to the idea that only such principles triggers the 
mechanism provided for in Article 99.3 capc.
the suggested interpretation is more plausible, if the csps is able to state 
clearly “principle of laws” which serves as mandatory authority by the cham-
bers. It is likely that the latter are willing to acknowledge the obligation set 
forth in Article 99.3 capc.
there can be significant doubts as to whether the aforementioned mecha-
nism has been introduced in any way as a precedent rule. It could be interpreted 
as yielding just a negative bound, that is to say not an actual obligation to 
accept the interpretation endorsed by the capc, but a prohibition to make 
an overruling accompanied by the duty to refer to the Plenary itself for the 
possible change of such an interpretation.38
concerns about the compatibility of a precedent rule with the principle of 
legality and hierarchy between the legal sources, as provided for in the cons-
titution, are expressed in the governmental report on which the amendment 
to the csps is based. the report emphasizes that this new mechanism does not 
introduce stare decicis, because such doctrine would conflict with the principle 
according to which judges are only subject to the laws enacted by the Italian 
Parliament (art. 101.2 It. const.).
thus, it would serve as a strict procedural limitation, since the obligation 
does not concern the substantive principle of law (which only the legislature 
can enact) rather blocks a decision incompatible with a principle declared 
by the Plenary session. In my opinion such an argument – a procedural one 
and not a substantive obligation – appears to be misplaced in this context.39 
36 Both in the Italian (“enunciare”) and in the English the meaning of “to enunciate” is making 
a statement “in clear or definite terms”.
37 follieri (2012, p. 1255).
38 In the literature a trend to minimise the meaning and impact of such a provision seems 
to prevail. see verde (2012, p. 25); sassani (2006, p. 217), both actually referring to the 
court of cassation very similar rule.
39 the same can be observed as regards such a claim as the one according to which one thing 
is to oblige a chamber to the adoption of a consistent decision with a Plenary session pre-
cedent another is the non adoption of a dissenting decision. this is maintained by luiso 
(2003, p. 820).
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Perhaps a more serious objection to the binding effect of the ruling by the 
capc is that there seems to be no direct remedy against a chamber decision, 
which has been made irrespective of the alleged obligation. moreover, and a 
highly regarded scholar has noted, no general remedies against the council 
of state decisions look viable in such an event40.
there are three general remedies available under the law: a) an appeal to 
the court of cassation; b) the so called “revocation”; and c) the opposition of 
a third party. the appeal to the court of cassation is only available in cases 
where the council of state has decided a case outside its own jurisdiction, ultra 
vires. A commentator has suggested that if a chamber decides a case overruling 
a principle established by the Plenary rather than referring to the Plenary 
itself, then it is using a power outside of its jurisdiction41. the advantage of 
this thesis would be to establish a link between a general external nomophi-
lactic function – belonging to the court of cassation – and an internal one 
– exercised by the csps, thereby reinforcing the latter.
to date there have been no such cases, however, this proposal de facto would 
allow the court of cassation to deal with a question of merit, assessing how 
and to what extent a principle established by the Plenary session has to be 
applied by the council of state, a matter that actually does not relate to the 
external limits of the jurisdiction42. Furthermore, and to be discussed below, 
the relationships between the csps and the chambers regard the internal or-
ganisation of the council of state as a whole.
the second remedy, a recourse for revocation against a decision of the 
council of state, is only admissible in exceptional circumstances strictly 
provided for by the law, including but not limited to the following: (1) new 
evidence that a party could not convey in the proceeding for causes not de-
pending on his/her own will; (2) a deceitful behaviour of one of the parties 
towards the other; or (3) a violation of the res judicata, etc. thus, this remedy 
is not applicable for purposes of this discussion.
lastly, the extraordinary remedy of the opposition of a party absent from 
the proceedings, even though he or she should have given notice as their 
rights were at stake, is the only which appears to be applicable for the case at 
hand. For instance, a party would be able to claim that the decision of one of 
the chambers of the council of state, which he or she is challenging, in so 
far as its ruling overcomes a precedent of the Plenary, is void for not having 
referred to the Plenary itself. thus a remedy is available, however is applies 
to an unlikely case in which a person did not participate in the proceedings 
because he or she was unaware.
40 follieri (2012, pp. 1261-6).
41 oGGianu (2011, p. 87). 
42 follieri (2012, p. 1263).
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should we conclude that these new rules are far from attaching any legal 
force to the ruling of the Plenary session? this would be equally misleading. 
the facts stand that a chamber, as dictated by law, cannot make a decision 
which conflicts with a principle of law enunciated by the csps. But what hap-
pens then if a chamber fails to do so?
like in other cases provided for in the Italian legislation, the consequences 
of the violation do not concern the decision made irrespective of the procedu-
ral requirement – sanctioning it as invalid – but they do affect the individual 
conduct of people who acted in such a way43.
In other words, the judges assume a risk of incurring disciplinary liability 
and being sued for damages if a party adversely affected by the decision sues 
the state for compensation claiming that the decision was gravely negligent.
significant controversy related to the liability of judges surround the limits 
to their activity in interpreting the law, especially when departing from well 
established case law. this presents a slippery slope, especially in light of the 
principle of the subjection of judges only to statutory law. there seems to 
be sufficient grounds to affirm that a decision of a chamber which overrules 
a principle established by the Plenary is a clear and gross violation of a rule 
which provides no exception, thereby creating potential judicial liability, 
which will be discussed in the following section.
however, it is worth clarifying in what sense such legal provisions would 
be reconcilable with a stare decisis (horizontal effect) mechanism. In fact, there 
is hierarchical order at stake here regarding the relationship between the csps 
and each chamber of the council of state. the latter is only an internal division 
of labour, an organizational matter, which does not affect the jurisdictional 
role of the council of state as one court.
hence, the mechanism at hand remains a case of horizontal binding prece-
dent, in so far as it compels the council of state, which normally operates via 
one of its chambers, to follow the principle of law previously enunciated by 
the same court (in its plenary composition though). nevertheless, one should 
note that a pure common law mechanism of stare decisis has not been achieved 
for a different reason from the one discussed above. In fact, there are no rules 
which constrain the csps to follow its own rules, so it remains free to overrule 
a “principle of law” previously enunciated.
In this respect the csps is similar to the ecJ position. the mechanism esta-
blished by the law is built on the internal functioning of these judicial bodies 
43 We could think for example of the rules establishing certain formal and procedural re-
quirements of the decision-making process, whose violation not necessarily causes the 
invalidity of the decision itself but can bring about the liability of the decision-makers 
(see article 21-octies of administrative procedure Act n.º 241 of 1990 in connection with 
articles 4-11 of the same Act).
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(the Italian higher courts), producing yet another particular type of binding 
precedent rule, which is a hybrid between a vertical and horizontal effect.
First level (regional) administrative courts are not affected by the reform, 
as they are not formally bound to follow a csps precedent, and there are no 
provisions regarding indirect binding effects in what the law establishes, re-
lated to the proceedings in matters of private law litigation.
one can easily envisage that the aforementioned horizontal effect will 
inevitably influence the vertical dimension too, strongly reinforcing the per-
suasive effect of the council of state case law when bound by a principle of 
law enunciated by the csps.
Iv. JUdIcIAl rEsPonsIBIlItY For cIrcUmvEntInG  
A PrEcEdEnt?
As previously discussed, regardless of the regime of precedent employed in 
the higher administrative, its efficacy will largely depend on the emphasis 
placed on judicial responsibility.
Judicial liability is regulated in Italy by the Parliament Act 1988, n.º 117. 
those who seek remedies must file an action before an ordinary court against 
the state, which can be filed against judges who have been charged with 
negligence.
In these cases, the following strict elements must be proven: a) a causal 
nexus between the damages and the decision which has failed to comply with 
the remittal duty; and b) such a failure has to be deemed pretty harsh.
the Italian provision sets forth that a judge shall be liable in cases of a 
“grave violation of law determined by inexcusable negligence”. Judges are not 
held when the activity involves the ordinary “interpretation of norms of law” 
and the “evaluation of evidence”.
According to the case law, cases of gross negligence have been interpreted 
in a way which leads judges virtually to always deny it. It is commonly said, 
indeed, that there is responsibility only when a judge behaves in a way that 
yields a macroscopic and coarse violation of legal sources. It is so when he or 
she provides an interpretation conflicting with elements of logic, producing 
unacceptable consequences in reconstructing the will of the legislator, or 
manipulating legal texts as to enter into “free law”.
In other words acts are not limited to gross negligence, but can classify as 
inexplicable behaviour in the context of the proceedings that can be associated 
with insanity or outright deceit.
one can easily explain this tendency in case law both as a protective attitude 
of the courts, and as an example of the difficulty of striking a balance between 
the independence of the judiciary and its allegiance to the law.
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on a more detailed level, Article 99.3 of capc presents a different approach. 
here the duty to abide by the principles expressed by the Plenary session is 
assisted by a procedural device which cannot be questioned. Almost parado-
xically it is the use of an allegedly weak (in the viewpoint of those skeptical 
about the introduction of a stare decisis rule) procedural device which makes 
the judicial duty stronger.
Before introduction of this mechanism into the legal system, and according 
to the case law when an inferior court departed from the interpretation provi-
ded for by the United chambers of the court of cassation, the responsibility 
of the judges would be eliminated if they provided reasons grounded in the 
law to defend such decisions. only if they utterly failed to do so would they 
be charged with the responsibility.
now, however, at least within the relationship between the chambers and 
the plenary, this option has been expressly ruled out. If the departing judges 
give reasons based on law, then they know that there is a conflict, and in 
such a case they are necessarily aware that they are expected to resort to the 
Plenary. A violation of this duty, although “procedural”, stands in my view for 
an inexcusable negligence which opens the way to state/judicial liability44.
this is especially true when the parties have expressly mentioned a certain 
precedent/principle of law during the proceedings. If this is not the case, then 
such a gross negligence can still occur when the principle at stake has been 
frequently applied by the council of state.
more puzzling is the case where the chamber wants to depart from an 
obiter dictum of the Plenary, which as such, as we have seen before, should not 
be binding for successive nor inferior courts. In fact, dealing with obiter dicta 
entails carrying out a normal “activity of interpretation of norms of law” which 
cannot lead to liability.
As for the alternative device, represented by the disciplinary action aiming 
at punishing an administrative judge who fails to abide by the “precedent ru-
le”, it can be promoted both by the Prime minister and the President of the 
council of state before the Presidency council for the Administrative Justice, 
a kind of self-governing body of the judiciary. In this case, parties have no 
chance of using it as a means to put pressure on magistrates, even though they 
can still request one of these two competent authorities to act in the manner 
previously mentioned.
the actual disciplinary consequences of this kind of professional responsi-
bility, seem to function in a legal vacuum. the relevant statute (Act of Parlia-
ment n.º 186/1982) refers to cases of violations and sanctions as disciplinary 
measures provided for ordinary judges. strangely the latter (Act of Parliament 
44 In the same vein see follieri (2012, p. 1237).
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n.º 109/2006) states that it shall only apply to ordinary judges, thereby ex-
pressly excluding administrative judges.
to avoid a situation where a disciplinary proceeding occurs without a 
substantive regulation related to such responsibility, the only solution is to 
consider the reference to the law applicable to ordinary courts which is the 
royal legislative decree n.º 511/1946 (decree), which was repealed by the 
2006 Act referred to above.
According to Article 18 of the decree, the disciplinary illicitness of a judge 
occurs whenever he or she “fails to comply with her own duties or he or she 
behaves in or out of the office in a manner that makes he or she unworthy of 
the trust and consideration, which he or she is expected to enjoy, or which 
negatively affects the prestige of the judiciary order”45.
this provision is broad in scope and permits applicability to the behaviour 
of a judge who does not refer to the Plenary while overruling a precedent of 
the Plenary itself. In such cases disciplinary sanctions range from mild punis-
hment, such as warnings and formal reprimands, to more serious ones, such 
as the loss of benefits from seniority, dismissal, and destitution which also 
entails the loss of the right to a pension. It is obviously very difficult to esta-
blish which of the sanctions is suitable for a violation based on the disregard 
for a principle of law established by the csps and a large amount of discretion 
is bestowed upon the Presidency council.
v. ProBlEms ABoUt stAtE rEsPonsIBIlItY  
For BrEAchInG EUroPEAn UnIon lAW
something conceptually alike in terms of judicial responsibility occurs with 
regard to the application of eu law.
Following the Van Gend en Loos case, the eec treaty has served as an agree-
ment which merely creates mutual obligations among the contracting states. 
the Union constitutes a new legal order of international law, for the benefit 
of which the member states have limited their own sovereign rights, although 
within limited fields, and whose subjects are not only the member states but 
also their nationals.
the status of eu law in the national legal systems is not a matter of domestic 
constitutional law, rather a matter of eu law itself. According to Costa v. enel 
“the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, cannot, be-
cause of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic provisions, 
however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law 
and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question”.
45 translated into English by the author.
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From these fundamental tenets, which embody the principle of primacy of 
eu law over national law, a number of consequences arise, primarily the duty of 
every national authority to set aside domestic law when it conflicts with eu law 
and the obligation on higher national courts to refer a preliminary question to 
the ecJ, when they have doubts regarding the meaning of any eu legal rules.
What is the consequence if a higher court – such as the Italian council of 
state – fails to comply with such obligations and thwarts the rights confe-
rred on individuals by a provision of a European directive? According to the 
Francovitch doctrine of the ecJ, this brings about state responsibility for the 
damages suffered by a private party.
In Kobler46 the ecJ held that in the light of the essential role played by the 
judiciary in the protection of rights derived by individuals from eu rules, the 
full effectiveness of those rules would be called into question and the pro-
tection of those rights weakened if individuals were precluded, under certain 
conditions, from obtaining reparation when their rights are affected by an 
infringement of eu law attributable to a decision of a court of a member state 
adjudicating at last instance. And this happens even if the decision in question 
is final, and subject to the principle of res judicata. therefore, a judge can incur 
a liability to the purpose of the A. of P. 1988, n. 117 also if he or she does not 
refer to the ecJ for a preliminary ruling erroneously assuming that Italian law 
is not in conflict with eu law.
Indeed a court is under a duty to give full effect to the provisions of Euro-
pean Union law, if necessary refusing its own motion to apply any conflicting 
provision of national legislation, including procedural provisions (such as the 
preclusion to raise questions for the first time in the appellate stage), and it 
is not necessary for the court to await the prior setting aside of that national 
provision by legislative or other constitutional means47.
the ecJ has recently reaffirmed such a rule answering a question raised by 
the Italian council of state, which sought to know the circumstances under 
which non-compliance with the obligation to make a reference for a preli-
minary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 267 tfeu may constitute 
a clear breach of European Union law, as a prerequisite for non-contractual 
liability on the part of the state for infringement of that law48.
so we can imagine a case in which a chamber evaluates that a principle 
of law established by the Plenary is in conflict with a eu norm or principle. 
here, the chamber finds itself in the difficult position of respecting both the 
national law and European law.
46 supra n. 17.
47 case c-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ecr i-8889, para. 31.
48 Judgment of the court (Fourth chamber) 18 July 2013 in case c-136/12, consiglio na-
zionale dei Geologi.
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one could simply say that such a conflict should be seen but as a reason to 
object to the soundness of the national principle and refer the question to the 
Plenary, activating the device provided for in Article 99.3 cpac. Yet, it would 
not be the ecJ response, which will set aside procedural rules if it is necessary 
to directly bring the question before itself49.
on a practical note, we can observe that if a court directly applies the eu 
principle rather than submitting the question to the Plenary, it would be very 
unlikely that the judges incur any liability at all, in the light of the aforemen-
tioned requirements of the “gross negligence” imposed by the law on judicial 
liability50.
A FInAl thoUGht
A final brief observation is prompted by an inquiry into the meaning of a type 
of stare decisis integrated into Italian public law?
however, I presume that this shift does not represent a late endorsement 
of the creative role of administrative courts, which in Italy and France, has 
historically been to a very large extent the champions of the construction of 
administrative law.
A case law-based legal system (at least an English one) is barely a place of 
“free-law”, as from time to time some enthusiast believe the exact opposite. 
In other words, the adoption of a system of stare decisis is not a way of reconci-
ling “real facts” (“living law”) and the law, but rather a way of harnessing and 
49 such a point has been actually made by the sicilian council for Administrative Justice 
(consiglio di Giustizia Amministrativa per la regione siciliana), order of 17 ottobre 2013, 
n.º 848/o, which has raised a preliminary ruling before the European court of Justice, case 
c-689/13, pending at the time of writing, seeking the court’s opinion on whether “in the 
event that doubts arise as to whether a principle of law already stated by the council of 
state in plenary session is in conformity with or is compatible with European Union law, 
is the chamber or division of the council of state to which the case is assigned under 
an obligation to make a reasoned order referring the decision on the appeal back to the 
plenary session, even before it is able to make a request to the court of Justice for a pre-
liminary ruling as to whether the principle of law in question is in conformity with or is 
compatible with European Union law; or, instead, may – or, rather, must – the chamber or 
division of the council of state, being national courts against whose decisions no appeal 
lies, independently refer – as ordinary courts applying European Union law – a question 
to the court of Justice for a preliminary ruling so as to obtain the correct interpretation 
of European Union law?”.
50 By the way the research of a decent solution of the issue of the tension between primacy 
and effectiveness of eu law and the so called “procedural autonomy” of member states 
is still on the table. regarding this see civitarese matteucci & Gardini (2013, p. 1) and 
civitarese matteucci (forthcoming).
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controlling the abundant creativity among the ranks of the judiciary, thereby 
boosting legal certainty.
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